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Abstract 
This study reconciles competing positions in the debate over whether democracy improves 
human development. We argue that electoral competition incentivizes politicians to provide 
public goods and services, and these, in turn, save lives. Hence, the electoral aspect of democracy 
should have a substantial impact on human development while other aspects, e.g. related to 
citizen empowerment or civil liberties, should be less consequential. Extant measures of 
democracy do not allow for the disambiguation of various components of democracy, which 
may help to account for the mixed results reported by various studies (contrast Ross 2006 and 
Gerring et al. 2012). 
We draw on the new Varieties of Democracy dataset, which provides a highly differentiated set 
of democracy indicators, and a new collection of mortality data compiled by the Gapminder 
project. With these tools, we are able to conduct panel analyses that include most (semi-
)sovereign countries from 1900 to the present – a much more extensive sample than has ever 
been mustered for this particular research question. We find that composite indices such as 
Polity have a tenuous relationship to human development, while indices focused on the electoral 
component of democracy yield a highly robust relationship. 
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Introduction 
Does democracy improve human wellbeing? Debate over this question generally focuses on the 
impact of regime-type on per capita gross domestic product (GDP) or on various economic 
policies that are thought to affect a country’s growth performance.1 Yet, GDP does not provide 
– and does not even purport to provide – a summary measure of human welfare, and is an 
especially poor guide to the welfare of less advantaged citizens (Costanza et al. 2009; Philipsen 
2015).  
To measure the welfare of the poor at national levels one must turn to a different sort of 
indicator, one focused on poverty (e.g., consumption-based income measures), life-enhancing 
policies (e.g., immunization and schooling), or more direct measures of wellbeing (e.g., health 
and educational attainment) (Dasgupta & Weale 1992; Morris 1979; ul Haq 1995). In contrast to 
GDP, these human development or quality-of-life indices reflect the status of those who are 
underprivileged. They are only minimally affected by the status of the middle and upper classes, 
who tend to enjoy salubrious lives wherever they happen to reside. Appropriately, human 
development indicators form the backbone of the Millennium Development Goals (Sachs & 
McArthur 2005). 
A small but growing body of literature examines the role of political institutions in 
fostering human development. Many studies report a causal connection between democracy and 
improved quality of life (Altman & Castiglioni 2009; Besley & Kudamatsu 2006; Blaydes & 
Kayser 2011; Brown 1999; Brown & Hunter 1999, 2004; Deacon 2009; Eterovic & Sweet 2014; 
Gerring et al. 2012; Ghobarah, Huth & Russett 2004; Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Hanson 2015; 
Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Lake & Baum 2001; Lindert 2004: chs 15–17; McGuire 2013; 
Muntaner et al. 2011; Przeworski et al. 2000; Stasavage 2005; Zweifel & Navia 2003).2  
This optimistic assessment has been strongly challenged in a series of recent studies 
(Doces 2008; Gauri & Khaleghian 2002; Hallerod et al. 2013; Jacobsen 2015; Houweling et al. 
2005; Miller 2016; Nelson 2007; Ramos & Tournillon 2014; Ross 2006; Rothstein 2015; Shandra 
2004). These scholars call attention to potential problems of causal identification arising from 
highly trended variables, sample bias, and non-robustness in the relationship of interest. In 
addition, they cast doubt on the mechanisms that might plausibly connect democracy to human 
                                                
1 Despite a fairly large body of work, researchers have not yet arrived at a consensus view on the question of 
whether democracy brings an economic dividend. For optimistic views see Acemoglu et al. (2014), Gerring et al. 
(2005), Knutsen (2015). For skeptical views see Barro (1996), Hausmann, Pritchett & Rodrik (2005), Przeworski et 
al. (2000). 
2 While most studies regard countries as units of analysis a few studies focus on subnational units – e.g., in Brazil 
(Fujiwara 2015) and the United States (Miller 2008) – and one study combines individual- and country-level data, 
but with a relatively small crossnational sample (Kudamatsu 2012). 
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development. First, voters may be focused on outcomes that are more salient such as 
employment, inflation, and economic growth, in preference to human development outcomes, 
some of which are difficult to dramatize and rarely covered by the news media (Harding & 
Stasavage 2014). If so, the mechanism of electoral accountability is called into question. Second, 
less economically advantaged citizens carry less weight in a polity, even a polity with full 
democratic rights (Przeworski 2010). Resources may therefore be captured by citizens who are in 
a better position to organize and to make demands on the state (Lipton 1977). Third, 
democratization is often accompanied by conflict and instability (Mansfield & Snyder 2005), 
which presumably impairs human development. Fourth, newly democratized polities are, almost 
by definition, poorly institutionalized and thus may be inclined to adopt clientelistic or populist 
policies rather than to undertake long-term investments in human capital (Kapstein & Converse 
2008; Keefer 2006). Finally, and relatedly, even if a democratically elected government enacts 
legislation in favor of human development, low state capacity may undermine efficient 
implementation. Democratic development without state development may doom progressive 
goals (Rothstein 2011).3 
This study attempts to reconcile competing positions in this important debate by 
showing that some aspects of democracy – but not others – affect human development. 
Specifically, we argue that the electoral aspect of democracy improves human development, 
while what we term the citizen empowerment aspect does not (or scarcely so). We argue, second, 
that electoral democracy contains multiple institutional components that interact with one 
another in a complementary manner to foster human development. Properly measuring these 
interactions is critical to understanding the impact of democracy on human development. It 
follows that composite indices of democracy – which combine electoral, empowerment, and 
often additional elements of democracy – may bear only a weak relationship to human 
development, especially if they do not take the mutual dependence between electoral 
components into account in their aggregation procedures. We argue, finally, that public policies 
serve as a key causal mechanism in this relationship. Electoral competition incentivizes 
politicians to provide public goods and services, and these, in turn, save lives.  
In addition to developing a theory to explain the connection between democracy and 
human development, this study also makes an empirical contribution to the literature. First, we 
enlist a new dataset compiled by the Gapminder project that measures mortality – infant 
mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy – for most sovereign countries from 1900 to the 
present. While extant studies generally focus on recent decades, we are able to interrogate change 
                                                
3 Writers discussed in this paragraph are not necessarily skeptical of a democracy-human development connection. 
However, their work is relevant to the skeptics’ argument. 
 
 
5 
across a century, affording greater empirical leverage into a question that involves highly-trended 
left- and right-side variables.  
Second, we draw on the new Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, which provides 
highly differentiated measures of democracy, measured annually for most sovereign countries 
from 1900 to the present (Coppedge et al. 2015; see also Appendix B). Prior work has been 
limited by the blunt nature of extant indices, which lump a variety of features together into a 
single index. The dominance of these indices may also help to account for the mixed results 
found in previous studies.4  
 We begin, in Section I, by laying out our argument about the causal relationship between 
democracy and human development. In Section II we explore the matter empirically using a 
variety of input and output measures and a supplementary mediation analysis to analyze potential 
causal mechanisms. 
 
I. Arguments 
Two general theoretical frameworks may be discerned in the literature on democracy and human 
development. The first focuses on citizen empowerment and the second on elite-level 
contestation.  
Following the participatory conception of democracy, democracy should affect human 
development through the empowerment of lay citizens and civic associations (Barber 1988; 
Benelo & Roussopoulos 1971; Christoforou 2010; Fung & Wright 2003; Kawachi 2001; 
Macpherson 1977; Mansbridge 1983; Pateman 1976, 2012; Putnam 1993). One avenue of 
empowerment is a free media. Granted freedom of the press, news outlets are likely to report on 
policy disasters such as widespread famine, enhancing their salience in the public mind and 
invigorating public dissent (Sen 1982). Likewise, by disseminating mundane information 
pertaining to public health (e.g., why it is important to utilize lavatories rather than open-field 
defecation), the quality of life may be improved (Wigley & Unlu-Wigley 2011). Another avenue 
of empowerment centers on the character of civil society. Social connectedness (aka social 
capital) should have positive repercussions for public health, providing “people with a basis for 
cooperation that is mutually advantageous, a source of aid or assistance, a means of staying well 
informed about health issues, and a source of self-esteem” (Wigley & Unlu-Wigley 2011: 653). 
Popular participation in politics may also have direct effects on public health. Wigley & Unlu-
Wigley (2011: 651) cite evidence from epidemiological studies showing that “the extent to which 
                                                
4 At issue is not simply the components themselves but also the way in which they might be combined into a single 
index. Aggregation matters, as numerous studies have shown (Goertz 2006; Munck 2009). 
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individuals perceive they have control over their lives plays a significant role in determining their 
health.” For all these reasons, one might expect a connection between citizen empowerment and 
human development.  
Yet, there are also reasons to doubt the participatory/empowerment narrative. First, 
there are questions about whether empowerment stands prior to, or posterior to, human 
development (see Inglehart & Welzel 2005). A large body of work suggests that health boosts 
economic performance (Hamoudi & Sachs 1999); it is not far-fetched to imagine it might also 
affect social engagement and political participation, as some studies suggest (e.g., Mattila et al. 
2013). If so, the relationship is circular. Second, some of the afore-mentioned channels do not 
operate independently of elite behavior. Specifically, insofar as a free press helps to avert policy 
disasters, it is through incentivizing politicians to take particular actions – a matter that lies at the 
heart of our alternative theory. Third, social capital is unlikely to bridge the enormous gulf 
separating rich and poor citizens. This is because social and civic engagement is fostered by 
strong ties, and strong ties are likely to be grounded in ascriptive and social class identities. 
Bonding often trumps bridging (Wright & Reeskens 2013). As a consequence, mechanisms of 
popular empowerment are unlikely to foster the kind of political and social ties that would 
greatly improve human development outcomes. Finally, and relatedly, improving nationwide 
conditions for human development requires vast resources. It is unclear how citizen 
empowerment could muster these resources or manage their distribution on a permanent basis, 
especially in a poor country with limited infrastructure. The state is the only actor with sufficient 
material and managerial capacity to make significant and sustained improvements in the quality 
of human life for the thousands or millions of citizens located across a national territory.  
Accordingly, we contend that any relationship between democracy and human 
development involves masses and elites within a structure of electoral accountability such that 
the resources of the state can be mobilized for a common purpose. Two features of electoral 
democracy concern us: selecting leaders and providing these leaders with the right incentives. 
Consider, first, the role of regimes in establishing mechanisms of leadership selection. It 
seems plausible that different sorts of people – with different ideologies and perspectives – 
might choose to enter politics, and might succeed in climbing the leadership ladder in relatively 
democratic and autocratic regimes (Besley 2005; Besley & Reynal-Querol 2011; Wintrobe 1998). 
Specifically, those who prize improvements in human development may be more likely to rise to 
the top of a democratic polity, while those who prize other goals, such as internal stability, are 
more likely to rise to the top of an autocratic polity.  
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Consider, second, the set of incentives facing such leaders once they gain office. As 
highlighted by numerous political-economy models, competitive elections establish a relationship 
of accountability between electors (principals) and leaders (agents) such that principals punish 
agents who do not perform as expected (Ferejohn 1986). It follows that when leaders compete 
for approval before the electorate in free elections, they will orient their policies to please their 
constituents. Insofar as electorates favor human development, democratic governments should 
seek to satisfy that desire.5 
 
Mechanisms 
A key causal mechanism in this argument lies in public policies adopted by governments, 
especially those that may be classified as redistributive (focused on those falling below median 
income in a society) or public goods (benefitting a broad swath of the general public). A simple 
median-voter model suggests that competitive elections pressure politicians to institute 
redistributive policies in order to address social inequality (Boix 2003; Meltzer & Richards 1981). 
Further, a large theoretical literature suggests that voters reward incumbents at the polls for 
resisting predation and providing public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake & Baum 
2001; Saint-Paul & Verdier 1993). 
The empirical literature has shown a strong correlation between democratic regimes and 
certain policies having a redistributive or public goods orientation. Such policies include 
education (Ansell 2010; Eterovic & Sweet 2014; Gallego 2010) – especially primary education 
(Brown 1999; Brown & Hunter 2004; Stasavage 2005) – and infrastructure, insofar as projects 
are focused on the needs of the masses (e.g., sanitation and clean water) rather than on privileged 
urban clienteles (e.g., hospitals) (Besley & Kudamatsu 2006). Some studies also find that 
democracy enhances aggregate levels of social spending and total public sector size (Boix 2001; 
Brown & Hunter 1999; Huber, Mustillo & Stephens 2008; Lee 2005; but, see Mulligan et al. 
2003), which (with some reservations) can be anticipated to correlate with the overall level of 
redistribution or of public goods. 
There is, therefore, ample reason to expect that democracy affects public policies, and 
the professed intent of those policies is quite clearly to improve human development. It is 
                                                
5 This is not to say that certain autocrats, under certain conditions, cannot be incentivized to pursue policies that 
improve certain human development outcomes. Recent studies point out that specific institutional features (e.g., 
Wright 2008), characteristics of the autocrat’s core supporters (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), or objectives of 
the ruling elite (e.g., Fielding, Freytag & Münch 2014) may induce leaders to pursue good policies even without 
contested elections. Still, we maintain that in most relevant contexts, improvements in electoral democracy should, 
ceteris paribus, strengthen leaders’ incentives to improve nation-wide human development outcomes. 
 
 
8 
another matter to claim that these policies achieve their stated goal, given the oft-noted 
inefficiency with which policies are administered in the developing world. Classrooms may be 
filled while teachers are absent (Chaudhury et al. 2006). Health care expenditures may not reach 
rural areas where they are most needed (van de Walle 1994). McGuire (2010: 9) notes that 
“voters in rich and poor countries alike tend to demand curative services excessively and 
preventive services insufficiently, so politicians who seek their support may well promise and 
implement policies that are not optimal for mortality decline.” Many factors connive to inhibit 
the delivery of public services to the poor, attenuating the connection between social spending 
and human development (Filmer & Pritchett 1999; Ross 2006).  
Despite inefficiencies, we expect that such policies still make a big difference in the lives 
of poor people throughout the world, and especially in the developing world, where their plight 
is especially grave. Conditional cash transfer programs, for example, have been found to increase 
enrollment rates, improve preventive health care, and raise household consumption (Rawlings & 
Rubio 2005). As a rule, and leaving aside “poverty trap” situations, we expect that the ease of 
improving someone’s condition is inversely proportional to the severity of their condition. The 
poor are, in this sense, easier to assist than the rich. So, even where service delivery is flawed we 
expect to find a relationship between policy effort, as measured by social expenditures, and 
human development outcomes. 
 
Electoral Democracy 
We turn now to the question of how to conceptualize and measure electoral democracy for the 
purpose of explaining human development. Electoral democracy is a highly diffuse concept that 
may include many potential ingredients and calls forth many potential aggregation techniques 
(Coppedge & Gerring et al. 2011). Issues of conceptualization and measurement are, however, 
inescapably theoretical; they do not flow ineluctably from a measurement model (Adcock & 
Collier 2001; Borsboom 2006; Munck 2009). And decisions about operationalization often have 
important consequences (Casper & Tufis 2003), a point that our analyses confirm. 
Electoral contestation is sometimes viewed as a binary feature of polities – either present 
(in democracies) or absent (in autocracies) (Boix et al. 2013; Przeworski et al. 2000). For some 
outcomes, a single-threshold measure is appropriate. However, when considering human 
development outcomes we see no reason to suppose that the impact of contestation conforms 
to a threshold causal model. Nor do we see any strong theoretical rationale for supposing that 
elections might matter in the presence of minimum competition (i.e., in electoral authoritarian 
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regimes) but not in the presence of free and fair competition. Our theoretical account suggests 
that a minimal amount of contestation is good for human development but that greater 
contestation is even better (cf. Miller 2016). The relationship between electoral contestation and 
human development should therefore be continuous and monotonic (though not necessarily 
linear). 
Relatedly, we argue that features having an appreciable impact on electoral contestation 
should also enhance human development. This includes all the institutional aspects of what Dahl 
(1989) has termed polyarchy, i.e., whether (or to what extent) key policymaking bodies are 
elective; rights of free association and free expression; the extensiveness of suffrage; and the 
quality of the electoral process. To the extent that a polity approximates the polyarchy ideal, 
human development should be improved.6 
We also argue that the elements of electoral contestation – clean elections, an (indirectly 
or directly) elected executive, free association, free expression, suffrage – have an interactive, 
complementary relationship with one another. While clean elections are perhaps the most 
crucial, each feature enhances the value of the others with respect to human development. 
Likewise, a single weak link may critically impair the attainment of electoral contestation. Most 
obviously, if there are no elections it matters little if the regime tolerates free association or free 
expression. Similarly, if participation in elections is restricted to a single party, it matters little if 
suffrage is universal. This follows from the idea that elites deploy a “menu of manipulation,” 
choosing different mechanisms to suppress competition, any one of which may be sufficient in 
securing incumbency (Schedler 2002). The ingredients of electoral contestation must be 
aggregated in a way that captures these complementarities, e.g., in a multiplicative fashion 
(following Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Munck 2009). 
We argue, following Gerring et al. (2012), that democracy is likely to have both short- 
and long-term effects on human development. Insofar as democracy affects public policies (as 
argued below), we can differentiate policies with more or less immediate effects (e.g., vaccinating 
infants) and policies that involve investments to be realized in the future such as improvements 
in roads, the electrical grid, sanitation facilities and the education of nurses and doctors. In order 
to take account of proximal and distal effects when the variable of interest is sluggish (and hence 
inappropriate for a distributed lag model) it is essential to calculate a “stock” measure of 
democracy that takes account of a country’s regime history, going back as far as is feasible. While 
all depreciation rates are in some sense arbitrary, we believe that a modest ten percent annual 
                                                
6 This closely follows Dahl’s  seminal work on the components of polyarchy (see also Dahl 1971; 1998). 
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depreciation rate is more plausible than the extremely slow one percent rate proposed by 
Gerring et al. (2012).  
 
Hypotheses 
The foregoing arguments culminate in a set of testable hypotheses, which we explore in the 
remainder of this study. 
• H1:  Indices focused on non-electoral aspects of democracy such as citizen 
empowerment, as well as composite indices that embrace multiple dimensions of 
democracy, bear a weak relationship to human development. 
• H2:  Indices focused on electoral democracy have a strong impact on human 
development. 
• H2b:  Electoral democracy bears a continuous and monotonic relationship to human 
development. 
• H2c:  Electoral democracy includes multiple elements which interact in a 
complementary fashion to foster human development. 
• H2d:  Electoral democracy has both short- and long-term effects on human 
development, appropriately modeled in a “stock” fashion. 
• H3:  A principal mechanism by which electoral democracy contributes to human 
development is through public policies, specifically social policies that target human 
development outcomes such as public health. 
 
II. Tests 
In this section, we endeavor to test the foregoing hypotheses in a systematic fashion. First, we 
discuss our approach to measuring human development. Second, we test the relationship 
between democracy – measured by composite and empowerment indices – and human 
development. Third, we introduce our proposed Multiplicative Electoral Democracy Index 
(“MEDI”). Fourth, we disaggregate MEDI into its component parts. Finally, we construct a 
mediation analysis focused on the role of public policies as causal mechanisms. 
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Measuring Human Development 
Human development can be measured in a variety of ways (McGillivray 2005; McGuire 2010: 
17-21). We choose to focus on mortality-based health outcomes – infant mortality, child 
mortality, and life expectancy – for three reasons. First, mortality measures a good of paramount 
importance to all people and upon which the enjoyment of all other goods depends. Life is 
primary. Second, mortality is relatively easy to measure since deaths are generally recorded, or at 
least remembered (and hence accurately registered in retrospective surveys). Likewise, mortality 
does not involve difficult debates over definition and operationalization, and does not take on 
different meanings in diverse contexts. A death is a death, regardless of when or where it occurs. 
Third, mortality-based indices offer strong coverage across countries and through time. The 
ability to project mortality rates backward in time – based on a variety of sources but most 
especially surveys and censuses – is a useful feature (Riley 2005).  
By contrast, measures of human development based on education are difficult to 
interpret since education is a hard thing to evaluate and often hinges on context. Even the 
measurement of literacy, a seemingly straightforward topic, is subject to the incomparability of 
languages and literacy standards throughout the world. Measures of health that add other 
features to mortality – e.g., disability-adjusted life-years – are more difficult to measure and 
therefore provide restricted temporal coverage. Policy-based measures of health such as 
vaccination rates are also limited in temporal coverage, and are not applied to highly developed 
countries, limiting spatial coverage. Composite measures such as the Human Development 
Index – combining health, education, and GDP – involve the foregoing problems as well as 
aggregation formulas that are hard to defend and to interpret (Acharya & Wall 1994; Kovacevic 
2011; Raworth & Stewart 2003).  
 In light of this, it is unsurprising that global studies of human development often focus 
on mortality-based indices (Sen 1998). Among these, we choose infant mortality as the focus of 
our benchmark analysis. Humans are most vulnerable in the first year of life, and this means that 
a society’s infant mortality rate (IMR), calculated as the number of babies who expire prior to 
their first birthday as a share of 1,000 live births, is likely to be sensitive to changes in public 
policy and to environmental disorders. Not surprisingly, it displays the highest variance among 
the three measures, both through time and across countries. While the child mortality rate 
(CMR; child deaths prior to age 5 as share of 1,000 live births) is sometimes preferred, the two 
indices are extremely highly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.99), and IMR offers a somewhat longer 
time-series for most countries. IMR is also highly correlated with life expectancy (LE) (Pearson’s 
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r=0.89; 0.93 with our transformed LE index), since early loss of life has the greatest impact on a 
society’s aggregate life expectancy. Thus, we regard IMR as the primary outcome of interest, with 
CMR and LE as secondary outcomes.7 Data is drawn from Gapminder with supplemental data 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators, as explained in Table A1. 
 To account for the bounded nature of IMR and CMR, which makes it more difficult to 
achieve improvements when a society has reached a lower level of mortality, both are 
transformed by the natural logarithm (following convention). LE is also bounded, but in a less 
obvious way. To account for this boundedness we recalculate the index by subtracting LE from 
the maximum value in our sample (85), and then taking the logarithm of that number. This also 
flips the scale so that, like IMR and CMR, a low number signals better performance. 
 
Composite Indices and Empowerment Indices 
We begin, in Table 1, by exploring several composite democracy indices that offer extensive 
coverage and fine-grained distinctions between levels of democracy.8 Polity2 (Marshall et al. 
2014) uses a weighted additive aggregation procedure across five sub-components: 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and regulation of 
political participation, and constraints on the chief executive. (The latter is accorded a 
particularly large weight, accounting for about 1/3 of the index’s range.)  The Unified 
Democracy Scores (UDS), developed by Pemstein et al. (2010), employ a Bayesian latent variable 
model to combine a large set of commonly used measures of democracy into a single index. 
Finally, we include two summary indices – “Contestation” and “Inclusiveness” – developed by 
Miller (2015), following the conceptual model developed by Coppedge et al. (2008). While 
intended to capture the two classical polyarchy dimensions of Dahl (1971), the measures also 
draw on indicators that seem to tap into other aspects of democracy. For instance, the 
“Contestation” measure draws on the Executive Constraints indicator from Polity and a measure 
of Legislative Effectiveness from Banks.  
A second set of indices, drawn from the V-Dem project, focus on various features of 
citizen empowerment, which provides the main alternative theoretical account for why 
                                                
7 Potential problems in the measurement of IMR – largely related to under-counting in poor countries – are 
discussed in Anthopolos & Becker (2009). While this problem is a concern, it may be regarded as orthogonal to the 
treatment of interest in this study – regime-type – and hence part of the error term. Insofar as per capita GDP 
(logged) explains under-reporting across the sample, as suggested by Anthopolos & Becker (2009), any remaining 
bias from measurement error is conditioned in our analyses. 
8 Accordingly, we exclude indices with shorter time-series, e.g., those produced by Freedom House, World 
Governance Indicators, and Bertelsmann Transformation Index, because they are less appropriate for estimators 
privileging within-unit change over time, as discussed below.  
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democracy might enhance human development. This set of indices includes Participation, 
Deliberation, Egalitarian, Female Empowerment, Civil Society, and Equality before the Law and 
Individual Liberty (see Appendix A1).  
 A final set of indices measure democracy in a binary fashion. The “BMR” index 
developed by Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013) resembles the wellknown Democracy-Dictatorship 
(“DD”) measure constructed by Przeworski and colleagues (Cheibub et al. 2010; Przeworski et 
al. 2000), which is based on the existence of multi-party elections. Unlike DD, BMR adds a 
participation criterion, checks for reports of electoral irregularities and does not rely solely on 
post-electoral alternation of governments when coding elections as free and fair, and extends 
back to the nineteenth century. A second binary measure, “BNR,” constructed by Bernhard, 
Nordstrom & Reenock (2001), covers 124 countries from 1913 to 2010. Following Dahl (1971), 
BNR define a country as democratic if there is a high level of contestation and at least 50% of 
the adult population is allowed to vote. 
 Each of the foregoing indices is tested in several plausible specifications in order to 
gauge their relationship to human development, proxied by infant mortality. The benchmark 
model, shown in the first row of Table 1, regresses IMR (logged) against a democracy index, per 
capita GDP (logged) – to account for levels of economic development – and year and country 
fixed-effects. We regard unit fixed effects as an important element in light of the probability that 
mortality rates may be affected by static country characteristics (related, e.g., to culture, colonial 
experience or geography) that may otherwise serve as confounders. We regard year fixed effects 
as equally important elements of the model since mortality reduction may be fostered by global 
factors that affect all countries such as the diffusion of health-relevant information and 
technological developments. An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is employed, and 
standard errors are clustered by country in order to deal with panel correlated errors. All right-
side variables are lagged one time-period (one year) behind the outcome.  
The second set of tests, shown in the second row of Table 1, calculates each democracy 
index as a stock variable, extending back to 1900 with an annual depreciation rate of ten percent. 
This is intended to embrace both short- and long-term effects of democracy on human 
development by imposing a modest depreciation rate. The third set of tests, shown in the third 
row, again calculates each index as a stock variable, this time with a very slow annual 
depreciation rate of one percent (following Gerring et al. 2012). The final set of tests, shown in 
the fourth row, introduces a lagged dependent variable to the previous specification in order to 
correct for possible trend effects or potential unmeasured confounders.  
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Each column in Table 1 thus reports four regressions, with results inserted only for the 
key variable of interest. Naturally, the interpretation of the coefficients in each of these four 
models is somewhat different. At present, however, we focus only on statistical significance, 
taking the classic p-value thresholds (90%, 95%, and 99%) as markers of success. This is 
arbitrary, to be sure, but it has the virtue of imposing a uniform threshold and is therefore useful 
for comparing the performance of different measures of a similar underlying concept. 
 Results posted in Table 1 suggest that these ten measures of democracy are not 
associated with lower infant mortality with a simple level measure (row 1) or when stock indices 
are calculated with a ten percent annual depreciation rate (row 2). A negative association with 
IMR is revealed (for most measures) when stock is depreciated at the very slow rate of one 
percent annually (row 3), corroborating Gerring et al. (2012). However, this result does not hold 
when a lagged dependent variable is added to the model (row 4). The importance of a lagged 
dependent variable in this model can hardly be over-stated, given the highly trended nature of 
both the right- and left-side variables of interest. Without some way to effectively de-trend the 
data, spurious results are highly probable. (There are of course other approaches, as explored in 
the next section.)  
We conclude, therefore, that composite democracy indices, along with indices focused 
on various elements of citizen empowerment, are not robustly associated with human 
development as proxied by IMR. So far, the relationship between democracy and IMR appears 
weak and fragile – contingent upon particular ways of measuring the independent variable and 
particular choices among covariates. This seems to corroborate previous studies that are 
skeptical of a connection between democracy and human development in general (e.g., Ross 
2006).9 
 
                                                
9 Additional tests (not shown) suggest that the stock (1%) measure of Polity2 is related to declining IMR in a lagged 
DV model only when (a) the sample is restricted to the contemporary period (1960-) and (b) standard errors are not 
clustered by country, as initially reported in Gerring (2012). 
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Table 1:   Composite Indices and Empowerment Indices 
 
 Compos i t e  Ind i c e s  Empowerment  Ind i c e s  Binary  Ind i c e s  
 
Polity2 UDS 
Contes 
-tation 
Inclusive 
-ness 
Partici 
-pation 
Deliber 
-ation 
Egalit 
-arian 
Female 
Power 
Civil 
Society 
Individual 
Liberty BMR BNR 
 (Marshall) (Pemstein) (Miller) (Miller) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (Boix) (Bernhard) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Level -0.004 -0.041 -0.068 -0.069 0.239 0.034 0.148 -0.014 0.114 0.054 -0.046 -0.044 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.052) (0.044) (0.147) (0.067) (0.142) (0.185) (0.083) (0.080) (0.036) (0.036) 
2. Stock (10%) -0.001 -0.002 -0.012 0.010 0.026 0.002 -0.004 -0.010 0.008 -0.002 -0.016* -0.017** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) 
3. Stock (1%) -0.000* -0.002* -0.008** 0.004 -0.004 -0.009** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.008* -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
4. Stock (1%), Yt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPpc (ln) ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 154 154 152 152 156 150 150 149 150 150 151 154 
Years  111 63 105 105 111 111 111 111 111 111 107 60 
Obs (approx.) 8505 7077 7568 7579 9333 9022 9022 7802 8987 9022 7982 6608 
 
Outcome: Infant mortality rate (ln).  For each index, we conduct four separate tests: (1) level, (2) stock (10% annual depreciation rate), (3) stock (1% annual depreciation rate), and (4) stock (1% annual 
depreciation rate) with a lagged dependent variable.  Units of analysis: country-years.  FE: fixed effects.  All right-side variables measured at t-1.  Estimator: ordinary least squares, standard errors clustered 
by country. *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10  
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A Multiplicative Electoral Democracy Index (MEDI) 
In contrast to wide-ranging composite indices and more focused empowerment indices we 
hypothesize that indices focused on the electoral component of democracy will be robustly 
associated with improved human development. This disaggregated approach to measuring 
democracy is made possible by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Because the results 
of this study depend upon the validity of the underlying data, we include a general description of 
the data collection process in Appendix B.  
Our chosen index draws on indicators that tap into the institutional procedures 
emphasized by Dahl (1989) in connection with the concept of polyarchy. Specifically, it is 
intended to measure the extent of responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens 
through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be maximized when (a) 
elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities, (b) the chief executive of 
a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections, (c) suffrage is extensive, (d) 
political and civil society organizations operate freely, and (e) there is freedom of expression, 
including access to alternative information. A full description of each component can be found 
in Table A1.  
Following our hypothesis of complementarity across factors, these elements are 
multiplied together to form a Multiplicative Electoral Democracy Index (MEDI). Note that 
because three of these components – (a), (b) and (c) – have a true zero, this method of 
aggregation applies a weakest-link interactive principle (to those components). A polity receives a 
zero score if any of these three sub-components is coded 0 and the impact of one component 
depends on the scores of other components.  
In Table 2, we subject MEDI to a series of empirical tests that begin with formats 
explored in Table 1 and then expand to provide a fuller set of robustness tests. A key feature of 
this table is the incorporation of measurement error drawn from the V-Dem measurement 
model, where multiple raters are combined into a single point estimate along with a confidence 
interval for each country-year-indicator, as described briefly in Appendix B and more extensively 
in Pemstein et al. (2015). Note that measurement error associated with democracy and other 
macro-level indices, while often informally acknowledged, is rarely incorporated into empirical 
tests. We do so here by running the specified model on 900 draws of the posterior distribution 
estimated for MEDI, based on an aggregation of the posteriors for each component of the index 
(Pemstein et al. 2010). 
Model 1 in Table 2 is regarded as the benchmark. Here, MEDI is measured as a stock 
17 
 
variable with a ten percent annual depreciation rate. Recall that this represents a compromise 
between no stock (the untransformed, level variable) and a very weak depreciation rate of one 
percent annually that counts distant history nearly as heavily as the recent past. As it happens, 
MEDI predicts lower IMR regardless of which depreciation rate is employed, as shown in 
Models 1-3. 
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Table 2:   MEDI and Mortality 
 
Outcome (Y) IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR(WDI) CMR LE 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS FD, RE OLS OLS OLS OLS Sys. GMM OLS OLS OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Imputed Full 5-yr panel Full Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
MEDI   -0.222***           
   (0.072)           
MEDI stock   -0.017***            
   (1%)  (0.004)            
MEDI stock  -0.058***   -0.002** -0.023*** -0.079*** -0.038*** -0.164***  -0.009** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.021*** 
   (10%) (0.013)   (0.001) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) 
MEDI stock          -0.028*     
   (10%), T-30         (0.015)     
GDPpc (ln) -0.389*** -0.380*** -0.419*** -0.002 -0.064***  -0.378*** -0.479*** -0.422*** -0.070*** -0.338*** -0.385*** -0.184*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.004) (0.016)  (0.053) (0.033) (0.080) (0.024) (0.058) (0.072) (0.036) 
Urbanization       0.328       
       (0.268)       
Fertility (ln)       0.422***       
       (0.085)       
Growth       0.002**       
       0.001       
Internal Conflict       0.008       
       (0.027)       
External Conflict       0.005       
       (0.034)       
Corruption stock       0.057***       
   (10%)       (0.016)       
Yt-1    0.978***      0.914***    
    (0.004)      (0.030)    
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Time trend          ü    
Countries 150 150 150 150 150 165 106 172 130 150 150 151 150 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 112 110 114 81 22 51 81 111 
Obs 8776 8776 8776 8693 8615 9965 6309 15246 7074 1684 6179 7176 10,029 
R2 (within) (0.909) (0.910) (0.905) (0.996) 0.116 (0.887) (0.937) (0.852) (0.885)  (0.849) (0.865) (0.895) 
 
Outcomes (Y): IMR (infant mortality rate, logged), CMR (child mortality rate, logged), LE (life expectancy, reverse scale, logged).  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1 
unless otherwise noted.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), FD (first-difference), RE (random effects).  All models incorporate measurement error for MEDI based on posteriors produced by 
the V-Dem measurement model.  Robust standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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In Model 4, we return to the benchmark depreciation rate of ten percent, this time 
including a lagged dependent variable on the right side. This model estimates how MEDI stock 
at t-1 affects changes in infant mortality from t-1 to t. While the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is high (0.97), confirming the highly trended nature of IMR, higher MEDI 
stock is still associated with reductions in mortality, and the effect is significant at the 5% level. 
In Model 5, we adopt a first-difference specification, with a random effects estimator, in 
which right- and left-side variables are measured as a change from t-1 to t. This approach to de-
trending reveals a very similar result. 
In Model 6, we remove per capita GDP from the model, leaving a bivariate regression in 
which IMR is regressed on MEDI (along with year and country fixed effects). The estimated 
impact of a change in MEDI stock is enhanced, relative to the benchmark model. If one is 
willing to believe that electoral democracy has a (positive) causal effect on GDP per capita 
growth (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Gerring et al. 2005; Knutsen 2015), this model may be regarded as 
providing an estimate of the total effect of MEDI on IMR. Because this is a contentious claim 
taking us well beyond the scope of the present study, and because income may simultaneously 
affect regime type, we revert to the standard interpretation in subsequent tests – i.e., that MEDI 
affects human development through channels other than economic development (holding per 
capita GDP constant). 
In Model 7, we add several additional covariates to the benchmark model that might be 
expected to affect infant mortality and perhaps MEDI. These potential confounders include 
urbanization, fertility, GDP per capita growth, internal conflict, external conflict, and corruption 
– as described in Table A1. Although the sample is diminished, the coefficient estimate for the 
key variable of interest is comparable to the benchmark, suggesting that this result is not 
sensitive to alternate specifications. The inclusion of indices measuring conflict and corruption is 
noteworthy, as it suggests that MEDI is not serving as a proxy for state capacity. (The inclusion 
of other measures of state capacity, drawn from the V-Dem project, confirms this result, as none 
of these covariates mitigates the estimated effect of MEDI on IMR.) We disregard these 
covariates in other models because they depress the sample and, more importantly, because they 
risk introducing post-treatment bias.  
Sample bias is a potential problem when units are not chosen randomly from a known 
universe, when that universe cannot be represented in its entirety, and when missing data is not 
missing at random, potentially affecting the results of a crossnational analysis of this nature (Ross 
2006). In particular, we must be wary of the possibility that data for democracy and IMR might 
be missing for poorly performing countries, low-income countries, and for non-democracies 
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(Halperin et al. 2005). To alleviate this concern, we impute missing data using the Amelia II 
software, which models the cross-section time-series structure of our data (Honaker et al. 2011). 
The resulting datasets include 203 countries observed across 114 years – or fewer, if the country 
was not independent during some portion of the 1900-2014 period – producing over 18,000 
observations. Results of our benchmark model averaged across twenty imputed datasets are 
shown in Model 8. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficient for MEDI is virtually identical to the 
benchmark model (with no imputed data). Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for per capita 
GDP diminishes by half in the imputed sample, suggesting that sample bias may affect this 
relationship. 
Another problem of causal identification concerns possible endogeneity between MEDI 
and IMR. One approach to this problem utilizes time to “exogenize” the regressor of interest. In 
our benchmark model, right-side variables are lagged one period behind the outcome. In Model 
9, we take this approach to an extreme, lagging MEDI by three decades (t-30), which should 
offer more assurance against X/Y circularity and simultaneity (an unmeasured confounder that 
affects both X and Y). The estimated coefficient is diminished relative to the benchmark, but 
remains sizeable and (weakly) significant. 
In Model 10, we enlist a more complex dynamic panel model known as system 
generalized method of moments (GMM), using a version developed explicitly for studying 
sluggish variables (Blundell & Bond 1998). Our chosen specification is run on 5-year panels, and 
includes a one-period lagged dependent variable as a regressor as well as a time trend (replacing 
the annual dummies). The 5-year panel is used to mitigate the too-many-instruments problem 
(Roodman 2009). In order to comply with the standard recommendation (fewer instruments 
than cross-section units) we also restrict the number of lags used for instrumentation to three 
(the third to fifth lag). The model treats both MEDI and GDP per capita as endogenous, and, in 
contrast with several alternative specifications (e.g., including a two-year lag on the dependent 
variable, modelling GDP as exogenous, or using 1-year panels) that we tried out, it performs well 
on all relevant specification tests.10 This suggests that Model 10 yields a consistent estimate of 
the causal effect of MEDI on IMR. The GMM model corroborates our main result, as MEDI is 
significant at 5%. Due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the long-term impact of 
MEDI on IMR – calculated as  MEDI/1- lagged DV  – is roughly -0.09, an estimate that is even 
larger than the benchmark model. 
The final set of models in Table 2 focus on alternate mortality-based outcome measures, 
as discussed above. Model 11 employs a measure of IMR drawn from the World Development 
                                                
10 The Hansen J-test p-value is .27, the Ar(2)- and AR(3)-test p-values are, respectively, .29 and .85. There are 148 
instruments, less than the 150 cross-section units.  
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Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2013), an alternate data source that is highly correlated with the 
Gapminder dataset but more limited in temporal coverage. Model 12 adopts the child mortality 
rate (“CMR”) as an outcome, transformed by the natural logarithm. Model 13 adopts Life 
expectancy (“LE”), a summary measure of mortality rates across the lifespan, with a transformed 
index (described above). These alternate outcomes corroborate the main result, despite the 
truncated samples for IMR (WDI) and CMR. MEDI is consistently associated with lower 
mortality. 
Several additional robustness tests are contained in Appendix A. In Table A4, we 
conduct restricted-sample tests in order to gauge the sensitivity of our benchmark estimate to the 
exclusion of particular regions – Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet region, Latin America, 
MENA, Africa, Western Europe and North America, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the 
Caribbean. Results show that the relationship between MEDI and IMR is robust, though 
estimates vary as the sample changes, as one might expect.  
In Table A5, we conduct tests of functional form. Recall that IMR is transformed by the 
natural logarithm, reflecting a theoretical expectation that mortality is more elastic at higher rates. 
In particular, we expect that improvements in mortality are easier to achieve when the mortality 
rate is high. This is in keeping with (a) the general downward trend in mortality throughout the 
modern world in the contemporary era, (b) the left-bounded nature of IMR, and (c) a well-
established tradition by which right-skewed variables (and IMR in particular) are logged. 
However, other transformations are also possible. Models 1-2 in Table A5 adopt a square root 
transformation, which deals with the skewed distribution of IMR but is also difficult to interpret 
and to make sense of (from a theoretical perspective). Another approach to functional form 
retains the linear (raw) format of IMR while adopting an estimator designed to handle skewed 
distributions, the Tobit regression (Long & Freese 2014). Results, shown in Model 3 of Table 
A5, are robust. However, one must be somewhat skeptical of these results given that we have 
dispensed with country fixed-effects, thus introducing a whole new set of potential specification 
problems. Suffice to say, we find the traditional approach to functional form – the logarithmic 
transformation – superior on both econometric and theoretical grounds. In Model 4, we examine 
the independent variable of interest, the MEDI index (discounted at 10% annually). The 
multiplicative aggregation rule, when combined with components that recognize a zero score, 
truncates this index at zero, generating a right-skewed distribution. Conceivably, results shown 
for our benchmark model may reflect a binary distinction – between country-years coded 0 and 
country-years receiving a positive score. Accordingly, in Model 4, we exclude observations for 
which MEDI (10%) is equal to zero. Results of all of these tests of functional form corroborate 
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our previously reported findings, as shown in Table A5. 
In Table A6, we explore possible non-linearities in the relationship between MEDI and 
human development. To do so, we replicate tests shown in Table 2 with an additional quadratic 
term – MEDI stock (10%)2. Results are indeterminate. The squared term is often (though not 
always) statistically significant. However, the sign of the coefficient is sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative, suggesting that curvilinearities – if present – are inconsistent or highly 
contingent upon the choice of estimators and specifications. Since we have no strong theoretical 
rationale for any non-monotonic effect we discard this possibility for now, leaving the question 
open for future research. 
In Table A7, we explore an instrumental-variable approach to estimation. Following 
recent work (Acemoglu et al. 2014; Knutsen 2011), we look to the process of diffusion as an 
instrument that may affect the assignment of the treatment (in this case, electoral democracy) but 
not the outcome (IMR) – except as mediated by the theoretical variable of interest (MEDI) – in 
order to satisfy the exclusion restriction. To do so, we employ the WAVE instrument of 
democracy from Knutsen (2011), as well as regional and global averages of MEDI, to tap 
exogenous variation in domestic MEDI stemming from international or regional trends. These 
are tested separately, and together, in Models 1-4, all of which focus on MEDI stock (10%). In 
Model 5, we apply the same technique – all instruments combined – with a focus on MEDI 
level. Initial tests with a two-stage least squares estimator followed the specification of our 
benchmark model, with country and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Although 
these tests yield highly significant, and substantively large, effects in line with our expectations, 
the Sargan-test p-values are often low, suggesting that the exclusion restriction might not hold. 
Thus, models shown in Table A7 add a lagged dependent variable to the benchmark model. In 
this specification we find that the instruments are strong, the Sargan p-values acceptable, and 
estimates for MEDI (both stock and level) are statistically significant and comparable in size to 
the lagged dependent variable model in Table 2 (Model 4). 
In Table A8, we explore possible non-linearities in a key covariate, per capita GDP 
(logged). Model 1 reproduces the benchmark model as a baseline for comparison. Model 2 
introduces a polynomial – GDPpc2 – intended to model a quadratic relationship. Model 3 
introduces a second polynomial – GDPpc3 – intended to model a cubed relationship. The 
variable of theoretical interest, MEDI stock (10%), is robust, though somewhat attenuated in the 
latter specifications. Thus, whether or not GDP bears a curvilinear relationship to human 
development, this has little bearing on our main finding. 
In Table A9, we conduct “horse-race” tests in which MEDI stock (with our preferred 
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10% annual depreciation rate) and various alternative indices of democracy (initially tested in 
Table 1) are regressed side-by-side in the benchmark model. We measure these alternative 
indices with a one percent annual depreciation rate. This is a strong test. Results shown in Table 
1 suggest that, for most indices, this very slow depreciation rate has a stronger relationship to 
IMR than faster depreciation rates when tested without the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable. Yet, these tests demonstrate that the inclusion of alternate indices in the benchmark 
specification do not interfere with the relationship between MEDI stock and reduced IMR. In 
some instances the estimated coefficient is slightly stronger and in some instances slightly 
weaker, but in all instances it remains statistically significant (at 1%). By contrast, most of the 
alternate indices are no longer significant, and for those that retain significance the estimated 
coefficients are considerably attenuated relative to the tests shown in Table 1. This offers direct 
corroboration for our main hypothesis: MEDI has a stronger relationship to IMR than other 
democracy indices. 
Having conducted a wide range of empirical tests intended to show that the relationship 
between MEDI and IMR is robust, we turn now to the question of substantive impact. To grasp 
the matter in a concrete setting, let us imagine a very poor country with a per capita GDP of 
$1,000 that has no regime history, or an extremely autocratic regime history (both of which 
render a score of 0 on the MEDI index; all other variables are set to their means). This 
approximates the condition of many African countries upon attaining independence in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Our benchmark model predicts that this country should experience an infant 
mortality rate of about 93 (per 1,000 live births). Now, let us suppose that this hypothetical 
country quickly transitions to high-quality democracy (as measured by MEDI) and maintains that 
level of democracy for a decade – without any increase in wealth. Our model predicts that the 
improvement in MEDI stock will result in a 50% drop in IMR – from 93 to 49 – during those 
ten years. Evidently, most countries’ histories are not so simple, or so dramatic. However, many 
poor countries have transitioned to multi-party democracy in a decisive fashion, and some of 
these transitions have occurred shortly after attaining independence. In any case, the purpose of 
this stylized example is to provide an illustration of what the coefficients entail for country 
performance. Democracy may have a dramatic effect on mortality rates, especially for countries 
at the low end of the democracy/development scales. 
Disaggregating and Re-aggregating MEDI 
The strong effect of electoral democracy on human development is, according to our theoretical 
expectation, a product of five components – clean elections, elected executive, suffrage, free 
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association, and free expression – working in combination. These indicators are correlated with 
each other, though not as highly one might expect. Pearson’s r correlations range from 0.39 to 
0.93 (see Table A3). In a principal components factor analysis (not shown) the first component 
explains roughly 70% of the variance. 
We argue that only in the presence of all features will incumbents be incentivized to 
expend efforts and resources on policies that improve human development for the poor. We do 
not expect that any of these components has a direct impact on human development in isolation 
from other components, with the possible exception of the core component of clean elections, 
which by itself could ensure meaningful contestation. 
To test this hypothesis, we generate stock variables for each of the five components 
using a ten percent annual depreciation rate (replicating our benchmark measure of MEDI). We 
then regress IMR against each of the components in our benchmark model. As expected, only 
the core component, Clean Elections, predicts lowered infant mortality.11 Other components of 
MEDI predict higher IMR (Elected Executive and Suffrage) or seem to have no relationship to 
IMR (Free Association, Free Expression). This provides strong evidence for our contention that 
the ingredients of electoral democracy have important interactive effects. One cannot account 
for the relationship between electoral democracy and human development without an 
aggregation technique that acknowledges these interactive properties. 
 
 
Table  3:   Ingredients of MEDI 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Clean Elections  -0.035***     
 (0.013)     
Elected Executive  0.018**    
      (0.007)    
Suffrage    0.036***   
   (0.011)   
Free Association    -0.009  
    (0.012)  
Free Expression     -0.003 
     (0.013) 
GDPpc (ln) -0.390*** -0.456*** -0.420*** -0.439*** -0.442*** 
 (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 153 150 155 150 150 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 
Obs 9138 8934 9278 8959 8971 
R2 (within) (0.902) (0.906) (0.903) (0.904) (0.903) 
 
Outcome: Infant mortality rate (ln). Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  All 
democracy indices measured as stock from 1900 (or first year for which data is available) with 10% annual 
                                                
11 This effect is not especially strong, however, judging from additional robustness tests (not displayed here). 
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depreciation.  Estimator: ordinary least squares with country and year fixed effects, robust standard errors clustered 
by country. *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10   
 
 
As a final test of our argument we investigate the consequences of choosing different 
aggregation rules, as shown in Table 4. That is, working with the same five components and the 
same stock depreciation rate (10%), we generate alternate indices by combining these 
components in different ways and then testing these indices in the benchmark model.  
To ease comparisons, Model 1 in Table 4 replicates our benchmark model (Model 1, 
Table 2), where MEDI is constructed according to a multiplicative aggregation rule. Model 2 
tests an alternative that is very similar in conception to MEDI, namely the minimum, or weakest-
link, rule (Goertz 2006). Conveniently, V-Dem indices are arranged across a 0-1 scale, assuring 
scale equivalence. According to the minimum rule, the index value for a case is equal to the 
indicator with the lowest value. Model 3 tests the V-Dem index of Electoral Democracy. This 
aggregation scheme, described at length in Coppedge et al. (2016), lies midway between 
multiplication and averaging. Model 4 tests an index constructed by the first component of a 
principal component analysis. Model 5 tests a final alternative where the index represents a 
simple average (mean) across all five indices.  
Results displayed in Table 4 show that the multiplication rule adopted by our preferred 
index, MEDI, out-performs all other aggregation schemes. Among the alternatives, those closest 
to MEDI in their construction – namely, the weakest-link index and V-Dem EDI – also predict 
lower infant mortality, though only at the 5% level. Other alternatives, which dispense entirely 
with the multiplicative logic of MEDI, show no relationship whatsoever to IMR. 
This finding corroborates our hypothesis that, with respect to human development, 
political institutions pertaining to electoral democracy are not substitutable. Rather, they 
complement one another. Aggregation schemes that average across these components, or 
observe only the common dimension (as identified by various factor analytic procedures), do not 
capture these interactions. It is not surprising, therefore, that they show no relationship to 
human development. More specifically, these results resonate with a body of work showing that 
there are many ways to subvert the ideal of electoral democracy even while maintaining a 
pretense of democracy by satisfying some elements of that ideal (Levitsky & Way 2010; Gandhi 
& Lust-Okar 2009; Schedler 2006, 2013). 
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Table 4:   Electoral Democracy Indices with Varying Aggregation Rules 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Multiplication -0.059***     
   (MEDI) (0.013)     
Minimum  -0.025*    
   (weakest-link)  (0.014)    
V-Dem EDI   -0.023   
   (½ mean, ½ 
mult.)   (0.017)   
Factor scores    0.002  
   (pca)    (0.003)  
Average     0.020 
   (arithmetic)     (0.015) 
GDPpc (ln) -0.388*** -0.405*** -0.422*** -0.439*** -0.441*** 
 (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067) 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 150 156 150 150 150 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 
Obs 8787 9333 8803 8787 8787 
R2 (within) (0.910) (0.898) (0.904) (0.904) (0.904) 
 
Outcome: Infant mortality rate (ln). Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  All 
democracy indices measured as stock from 1900 (or first year for which data is available) with 10% annual 
depreciation.  Estimator: ordinary least squares with country and year fixed effects, standard errors clustered by 
country.  *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10   
 
Mediation Analysis 
We have focused thus far on the hypothesized causal effect of electoral democracy on human 
development. Here, we turn to the question of causal mechanisms. Why might electoral 
democracy (measured with the MEDI index) be robustly associated with improvements in 
quality of life? In Section I, we argued that public spending plays an important role in this story. 
Specifically, selection effects (into leadership positions) and post-selection incentives (via 
electoral accountability) induce politicians in democracies to increase redistributive and public 
goods spending.  
Given our focus on mortality as a summary measure of human development, the most 
relevant – and measurable – causal pathway is health care spending. Regrettably, it is not possible 
to obtain fine-grained measures of health care spending for a large number of countries, e.g., on 
money spent in rural versus urban areas, hospital expenditures versus expenditures targeted on 
primary care, and so forth. Nonetheless, aggregate spending statistics are useful in this context as 
they generally reflect formal policies approved by top leaders. (Allocative decisions, by contrast, 
may be the product of decisions made by unelected bureaucrats and are on this account less 
relevant for present purposes, since our theory focuses on those at the apex of the policymaking 
process.) 
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While public expenditures have been examined by prior studies, these analyses have 
focused either on regime type and spending (Fielding, Freytag & Munch 2014) or on spending 
and health (Filmer & Pritchett 1999) – or, occasionally, on both, analyzed separately (McGuire 
2010). Our objective is to assess the role of health spending as a mechanism lying in between 
political institutions and health. To do so in an adequate fashion we must combine all three 
elements – X, M, and Y – into the same model. Accordingly, we employ a series of mediation 
analyses designed to test different indicators of health spending, different specifications, and 
different lag structures, as shown in Table 5.  
Three data sources for public health expenditures are utilized: Nooruddin & Rudra 
(2014), Jensen & Skaaning (2015), and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013). Data 
from these sources are correlated, though not as highly as one might think – which suggests the 
utility of running robustness tests with all three sources. The WDI offers the best country 
coverage, but the shortest time-series (16 years); consequently, we do not employ this data for 
models with country fixed effects.  
Public health expenditures may be measured as a share of (a) GDP, (b) total central 
government expenditures, or (c) population (per capita). Each of these measures seems relevant 
to our theory, though “effort” is probably best proxied by (a) or (b), so we regard these as 
providing somewhat more appropriate tests of our theory.  
The variable of theoretical interest – MEDI – may be measured as a stock (with a 10% 
annual depreciation rate) or as a level (unadjusted for history). We have already argued for a 
stock approach to this concept, but we also test the simpler level measure.  
Specifications may include country or region fixed effects (dummies for each major 
region of the world). Although the latter departs from our benchmark model, our mediation 
tests are limited by data coverage to shorter panels, raising questions about a unit fixed-effect 
model with sluggish variables on the left and right sides. All models include year dummies and 
per capita GDP (logged) on the right side. 
The lag structure among the key variables – X, M, and Y – may be modeled as Xt-Mt-Yt+1 
or (perhaps more plausibly) as Xt-Mt+1-Yt+2. The outcome of interest, mortality, may be measured 
by infant mortality (IMR), child mortality (CMR), or life expectancy (LE). 
The first model in Table 5 follows our benchmark model (Model 1, Table 2) closely. 
IMR (logged) is regressed on MEDI stock (10%), per capita GDP (logged), and country fixed 
effects, with public health expenditure (Jensen & Skaaning 2015) treated as the mediator in a 0-1-
2 lag structure. Here, we find that the indirect effect via public expenditure accounts for about 
19% of the total effect of MEDI on IMR, and the indirect effect is highly significant. 
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Subsequent models introduce permutations of this benchmark, altering one or more of 
the features described above. In all but one of these robustness tests the mediator is in the 
predicted direction, and it is significant at 1% in 16 of the 19 specifications. Thus, we find 
corroboration of our argument that the positive net effect of electoral democracy on health 
outcomes stems, in part, from the type of policies that autocratic and democratic leaders choose 
to pursue. 
Of course, one must bear in mind the strong assumptions required for mediation analysis 
(Imai et al 2011). In particular, estimates of an indirect effect are sensitive to the omission of 
other relevant mediators. In this instance, we have been able to identify only one potential 
(measurable) mediator. If there are others, and if these are correlated with health spending, 
estimates for health spending are attenuated. Second, data coverage for health spending is 
limited. Even the longest panel is only 35 years, and the variables of theoretical interest tend to 
be sluggish, as noted. This feature of the data may introduce bias when including country-fixed 
effects in a regression model (Nickell 1981) – hence, the importance of region fixed-effect 
models as supplemental tests.  
For these reasons, we have stronger confidence in estimates of the net effect, as shown 
in previous tables, than in estimates of the indirect effect, as shown in Table 5. Even so, the 
mediation analyses corroborate our theoretical claims and point the way forward for further 
investigation, perhaps including other possible mediators. 
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III. Discussion 
This study has taken a hard look at the relationship between regime-type and human 
development. While previous analyses focused on a few decades in the contemporary era and/or 
on highly aggregated measures of democracy, our analyses utilize fine-grained measures of 
democracy drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project and mortality-based human 
development indicators drawn from Gapminder and other sources, allowing us to track the 
quality of institutions, and the rate of mortality decline, across a century-long period. With this 
set-up we have made a strong case for the role of democracy in fostering human development. 
Moreover, we have pinpointed various aspects of this relationship that have eluded previous 
work on the subject.  
First, our results suggest that electoral competition bears a stronger relationship to 
human development than citizen empowerment (e.g., individual liberty, political equality, female 
empowerment, civil society, deliberation), and may be regarded as the driving force connecting 
regime-type to human development. The robustness of elite-level institutions vis-à-vis mass-level 
institutions supports a state-centered view of human development, in contrast to a society-centered 
view.12  
Second, we have demonstrated that the electoral aspect of democracy bears a continuous 
and monotonic relationship to human development. Binary indices such as BMR and BNR – 
while focused appropriately on the electoral aspects of democracy – discard important 
information, which may explain why they do not show a robust relationship to IMR, as shown in 
Table 1.  
Third, we have shown that rules of aggregation matter greatly for understanding this 
particular issue. Tests of various aggregation schemes, made possible by the highly disaggregated 
V-Dem dataset, demonstrate that a multiplicative rule out-performs other aggregation rules, 
suggesting that elements of electoral democracy interact with one another and that the impact of 
electoral democracy on human development is contingent upon this interaction. We suspect that 
aggregation rules play a similarly important role in other institutional relationships, an issue that 
is usually left un-tested. 
Finally, we have argued that a principal mechanism by which electoral democracy 
contributes to human development lies in an accountability relationship in which politicians are 
                                                
12 This is also supported by the preliminary results shown for a covariate measuring overall corruption (Model 7, 
Table 2), which seems to indicate a key role for state capacity in achieving human development. 
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incentivized to expand social policies. While scholars often highlight the inefficiency of social 
policies in the developing world (as discussed in Section I) – and our results by no means 
contradict this overall impression – it is worthwhile pointing out that social policies still matter. 
So far as we can tell, the “leaky bucket” of health expenditures contains enough water when it 
reaches its target to save a considerable number of lives. This, in turn, may be due to an 
important feature of social policy in the developing world, namely, the relative ease of saving a 
life in settings where mortality threatens on a daily basis. The worse off people are, the more 
effective a small dose of assistance is likely to be. That is why social policy does not need to be 
highly efficient in order to save a considerable number of lives in the developing world. 
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APPENDIX A: Data and Additional Tests 
 
Table A1:   Variable Descriptions 
 
Outcomes 
Infant mortality rate (IMR).  Babies who die prior to their first birthday as a share of 1,000 live births, 
transformed by the natural logarithm (unless otherwise noted). Missing data within a time series is interpolated using 
a linear model. Source: Gapminder (gapminder.org). Tag: imr_gapminder_ipo_ln 
Infant mortality rate (IMR), WDI.  Babies who die prior to their first birthday as a share of 1,000 live births, 
transformed by the natural logarithm (unless otherwise noted). Source: WDI (World Bank 2013).  Tag:  wdi_mort_ln 
Child mortality rate (CMR).  Children who die prior to their fifth birthday as a share of 1,000 live births, 
transformed by the natural logarithm (unless otherwise noted). Missing data within a time series is interpolated using 
a linear model. Source: Gapminder (gapminder.org). Tag: cme_gapminder_ipo_ln 
Life expectancy (LE).  Expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. The variable is 
transformed by subtracting LE from the maximum value in our sample (85) and then taking the logarithm of that 
number. A low number signals a lower mortality rate. Missing data within a time series is interpolated using a linear 
model. Source: Gapminder (gapminder.org). Tag: le_gapminder_ipo_85mln 
Components of MEDI 
Clean elections. Free and fair elections connote an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, 
government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The index is formed by taking the 
point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB 
capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting 
irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), 
and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index 
scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg). Source: V-Dem.  Tag: 
v2xel_frefair 
Elected executive. This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected 
through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive. 
There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which 
are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the 
extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature 
is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which 
house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the 
approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0).  Fourth, 
whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for 
the appointment of the head of government (c2=1, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government is 
appointed by the head of state (d=1) or not (d=0). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected (e=1) 
or not (e=0). Define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government 
(v2exhoshog==1), hosw=1. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the 
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal 
power, hosw=.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw=1-hosw.  Source: V-Dem.  Tag: v2x_accex 
Free association. This index attempts to measure the extent to which parties, including opposition parties, are 
allowed to form and to participate in elections, and the extent to which civil society organizations are able to form 
and to operate freely. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the 
indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), 
elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the 
multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election 
regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).  Source: V-Dem.  Tag: v2x_frassoc_thick 
Free expression. This index attempts to measure the extent to which the government respects press and media 
freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the 
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freedom of academic and cultural expression. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian 
factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), internet censorship 
effort (v2mecenefi), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship 
(v2meslfcen), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), 
freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression 
(v2clacfree).  Source: V-Dem.  Tag: v2x_freexp_thick 
Suffrage. The share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) that has the legal right to vote in national elections. This 
measure covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores 
reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of January 1 in a particular 
year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the 
people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male 
suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not 
reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like 
explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing 
so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, 
ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combining information on 
the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth 
distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very 
poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies.  Source: V-Dem.  Tag: v2x_suffr 
Other Measures of Democracy 
Polity2.  Measures the extent to which democratic or autocratic “authority patterns” are institutionalized in a given 
country. It takes into account how the executive is selected, the degree of checks on executive power, and the form 
of political competition. Source: Marshall et al. (2014).  Tag: e_polity2. 
UDS.  A democracy index comprised of multiple indicators and aggregated through a Bayesian IRT measurement 
model. Source: Pemstein et al. (2010). Tag: e_uds_mean. 
Contestation.  Defined as the “extent and fairness of electoral competition between parties and distinct interests,” 
including “the existence of independent political parties, the freedom of electoral competition, the extent of intra-
governmental constraints, legislative membership by opposition parties and the closeness of national votes,” as 
measured by a variety of extant indicators. Source: Miller (2015). Tag: contdim. 
Inclusiveness.  Defined as “the extent of popular electoral involvement across the citizenry,” understood as 
including suffrage and turnout, and measured with a variety of extant indicators. Source: Miller (2015). Tag: partdim. 
Participation. The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political 
processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: 
delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of 
democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, 
and subnational elected bodies. This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation 
(v2x_cspart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional 
government power(v2xel_regelec). Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2x_partip. 
Deliberation. The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a 
polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political 
decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According 
to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be 
respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent 
participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to 
which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in 
terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at 
elite levels. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the 
following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for 
counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage). Source: V-
Dem. Tag: v2xdl_delib. 
Egalitarian. The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social 
groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a 
formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social 
groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the 
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law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to 
seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. The index is 
formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution 
according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), 
social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq), equal access to 
health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrgen), share of budget allocated to 
public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-
tested benefits (v2dlunivl).  Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2x_egal. 
Female power. Political empowerment is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in 
civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, freedom from 
forced labor, representation in the ranks of journalists, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. The 
index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO 
women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists (v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women 
(v2cldmovew), freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), 
property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and power distributed by gender 
(v2pepwrgen).  Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2x_gender. 
Civil society. The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, 
citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals.  We call these groups civil society 
organizations (CSOs).  CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual 
organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, 
charities, and other non-governmental organizations. The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a 
measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely 
and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived. The index is formed by taking the point 
estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection – national/local 
(v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’s 
participation (v2csgender).  Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2x_cspart. 
Individual liberty. To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration 
impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, 
freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion? The index is formed by taking the point 
estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration 
(v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women 
(v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), 
freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of 
religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for 
men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).  Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2xcl_rol. 
BMR.  Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic 
have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.  Source: 
Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013). Tag: e_boix_regime. 
BNR.  Following Dahl (1971), a country is defined as democratic if there is a high level of contestation and at least 
50% of the adult population is allowed to vote.  Source: Bernhard, Nordstrom & Reenock (2011). Tag: e_bnr_dem. 
Covariates 
GDP per capita (ln).  Gross domestic product per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm.  Source: Maddison 
Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014). Tag: e_migdppc_ln. 
Urbanization.  Ratio of urban population to total population.  Source: V-Dem, constructed from data from CLIO 
Infra (clio-infra.eu). Tag: e_miurbani. 
Fertility (ln).  Fertility rate, transformed by the natural logarithm. The fertility rate (aka total fertility rate, period 
total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a 
woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and 
(b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific 
rates at a given time.  Source: WDI (World Bank 2013). Tag: e_miferrat_ln. 
Growth.  Annual growth rate of GDP per capita.  Source: Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014). Tag: 
e_migdpgro. 
Internal Conflict.  Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The 
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original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data 
contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal communication), we 
re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series 
(which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.  Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), 
compiled by V-Dem. Tag: e_miinterc. 
External conflict.  Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 
otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. 
However, the data contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal 
communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the 
original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.  Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing 
on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. Tag: e_miinteco. 
Corruption stock (10%).  Includes indicators of corruption in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the 
public sector at-large, aggregated with Bayesian factor analysis and then constructed as a historical stock with a 
10% annual depreciation rate.  Source: V-Dem. Tag: v2x_corr_stock_10. 
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Table A2:   Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Obs.  mean SD min max 
Infant mortality rate (ln)  12,130 3.811 1.058 0.531 6.040 
MEDI 15,432 0.184 0.288 0.000 0.944 
MEDI stock (1%) 15,432 4.729 9.642 0.000 56.778 
MEDI stock (10%) 15,432 1.485 2.474 0.000 9.228 
Clean elections (V-Dem) 17,661 0.324 0.358 0.000 0.995 
Elected executive (V-Dem) 16,382 0.517 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Free association (V-Dem) 16,105 0.473 0.332 0.023 0.966 
Free expression (V-Dem) 15,997 0.470 0.312 0.015 0.989 
Suffrage (V-Dem) 19,948 0.616 0.443 0.000 1.000 
      
GDP per capita (ln) 11,627 7.787 1.034 5.315 10.667 
Urbanization 20,764 0.350 0.251 0.008 1.000 
Fertility (ln) 13,371 1.349 0.525 -0.179 2.222 
Growth 10,694 1.933 6.452 -61.493 86.946 
Internal Conflict 12,932 0.098 0.297 0.000 1.000 
External conflict 16,612 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Corruption (10%) 16,369 3.887 2.495 0.027 9.294 
      
Polity2 (Marshall) 11,796 0.459 7.306 -10.000 10.000 
Polity2 stock (1%) 11,796 319.979 310.454 0.000 1,364.022 
Polity2 stock (10%) 11,796 87.391 64.412 0.000 199.999 
UDS (Pemstein) 8,802 0.013 0.979 -2.103 2.117 
UDS stock (1%) 8,802 46.621 36.928 0.317 191.096 
UDS stock (10%) 8,802 17.422 9.627 0.317 42.008 
Contestation (Miller) 9,878 0.471 0.356 0.000 1.000 
Contestation stock (1%) 9,878 13.923 14.373 0.000 63.604 
Contestation stock (10%) 9,878 3.889 3.082 0.000 9.969 
Inclusiveness (Miller) 9,916 0.519 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Inclusiveness stock (1%) 9,916 13.947 11.353 0.000 51.412 
Inclusiveness stock (10%) 9,916 4.255 2.363 0.000 8.846 
Participation (V-Dem) 20,055 0.277 0.222 0.000 0.889 
Participation stock (1%) 20,044 9.003 9.762 0.000 58.604 
Participation stock (10%) 20,044 2.377 2.038 0.000 8.658 
Deliberation (V-Dem) 16,301 0.422 0.308 0.010 0.992 
Deliberation stock (1%) 16,296 13.481 13.287 0.010 67.184 
Deliberation stock (10%) 16,296 3.607 2.780 0.010 9.904 
Egalitarian (V-Dem) 16,485 0.440 0.273 0.030 0.990 
Egalitarian stock (1%) 16,480 14.150 13.151 0.035 64.499 
Egalitarian stock (10%) 16,480 3.794 2.632 0.035 9.865 
Female power (V-Dem) 11,032 0.503 0.238 0.042 0.969 
Female power stock (1%) 11,032 13.234 11.276 0.042 57.273 
Female power stock (10%) 11,032 3.994 2.381 0.042 9.624 
Civil society (V-Dem) 16,296 0.438 0.292 0.024 0.993 
Civil society stock (1%) 16,285 14.204 13.184 0.024 66.112 
Civil society stock (10%) 16,285 3.748 2.687 0.024 9.910 
Individual liberty (V-Dem) 16,491 0.488 0.307 0.001 0.991 
Individual liberty stock (1%) 16,480 16.748 14.647 0.013 66.749 
Individual liberty stock (10%) 16,480 4.238 2.849 0.013 9.894 
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BMR (Boix) 10,577 0.362 0.481 0.000 1.000 
BMR stock (1%) 10,577 10.153 16.010 0.000 65.883 
BMR stock (10%) 10,577 2.965 3.909 0.000 10.000 
BNR (Berhard) 7,984 0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000 
BNR stock (1%) 7,984 7.218 11.120 0.000 45.284 
BNR stock (10%) 7,984 2.854 3.764 0.000 9.982 
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Table A3:   Correlation Matrix of MEDI Components  
 
 Clean elections Elected executive Free association Free expression Suffrage 
Clean elections 1     
Elected executive 0.604 1    
Free association 0.801 0.577 1   
Free expression 0.774 0.540 0.925 1  
Suffrage 0.497 0.589 0.418 0.386 1 
 
N = 15,432
 48 
Table A4:   Restricted Sample Tests 
 
Excluded 
region 
E. Europe, 
Post-Soviet Latin America MENA Africa 
W. Europe, 
No. America East Asia 
Southeast, 
East Asia South Asia Caribbean 
Sample 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 1900- 1940- 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
MEDI stock  -0.060 -0.051 -0.062 -0.053 -0.071 -0.068 -0.049 -0.038 -0.024 -0.034 -0.058 -0.051 -0.053 -0.050 -0.067 -0.058 -0.058 -0.054 
   (10%) (0.016) 
*** 
(0.015) 
*** 
(0.015) 
*** 
(0.016) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.018) (0.015) 
** 
(0.014) 
*** 
(0.014) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.011) 
*** 
(0.012) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
(0.013) 
*** 
GDPpc (ln) ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 122 122 130 130 135 135 104 104 130 130 144 144 143 143 144 144 148 148 
Years 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 111 71 
Obs 7715 6867 7496 6586 8013 7017 6493 5497 6729 6387 8460 7464 8360 7402 8413 7447 8617 7661 
R2 (within) (0.904) (0.874) (0.910) (0.878) (0.921) (0.896) (0.936) (0.926) (0.849) (0.840) (0.910) (0.880) (0.916) (0.880) (0.916) (0.885) (0.910) (0.882) 
 
Outcome: infant mortality rate (ln).  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  Estimator: ordinary least squares regression, standard errors clustered by 
country.  *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10  Each model excludes a region of the world, as noted.  
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Table A5:   Tests of Functional Form 
 
Outcome √! √! Y Y(ln) 
Sample Full Full Full MEDI>0 
Estimator OLS FD, RE Tobit OLS 
 1 2 3 4 
MEDI stock (10%) -0.021*** -0.007*** -1.948*** -0.060*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.703) (0.012) 
GDPpc (ln) ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü   ü 
Countries 150 150 150 140 
Years 111 110 111 111 
Obs 8787 8626 8787 7410 
R2 (within) (0.893) 0.132 0.107 (0.936) 
 
Outcome (Y): infant mortality rate.  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  Estimators: 
OLS (ordinary least squares), FD (first-difference), RE (random effects).  Standard errors clustered by country.  *** 
p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Table A6:   Possible Non-linearities in MEDI stock 
 
Outcome (Y) IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR IMR(WDI) CMR LE 
Estimator OLS OLS FD, RE OLS OLS OLS OLS Sys. GMM OLS OLS OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Imputed Full 5-yr panel Full Full Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
MEDI stock  0.036 -0.005*** 0.003 0.041 0.057** -0.055***  -0.033*** 0.030 0.008 0.030** 
   (10%) (0.025) (0.001) (0.007) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017)  (0.009) (0.023) (0.025) (0.015) 
MEDI stock  -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014***  0.004*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
   (10%)2 (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
MEDI stock        -0.009     
   (10%), T-30       (0.042)     
MEDI stock        -0.003     
   (10%)2, T-30       (0.005)     
GDPpc (ln) -0.355*** -0.002 -0.062***  -0.315*** -0.453*** -0.425*** -0.075*** -0.296*** -0.350*** -0.166*** 
 (0.063) (0.004) (0.015)  (0.049) (0.030) (0.079) (0.024) (0.059) (0.077) (0.036) 
Urbanization     0.065       
     (0.258)       
Fertility (ln)     0.499***       
     (0.081)       
Growth     0.001*       
     (0.001)       
Internal conflict     0.009       
     (0.026)       
External conflict     0.012       
     (0.028)       
Corruption (10%)     0.046***       
     (0.015)       
Y  0.981***      0.937***    
  (0.004)      (0.028)    
Y, T-2        -0.042    
        (0.092)    
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü  ü ü ü 
Time trend        ü    
Countries 150 150 150 165 106 203 130 150 150 151 150 
Years 111 111 110 112 110 114 81 22 51 81 111 
Obs 8787 8704 8626 9977 6314 17968 7081 1693 6176 7172 10029 
R2 (within) (0.916) (0.996) 0.121 (0.899) (0.943) (0.853) (0.888)  (0.858) (0.870) (0.900) 
 
Outcomes (Y): IMR (infant mortality rate, logged), CMR (child mortality rate, logged), LE (life expectancy, reverse scale, logged).  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables 
measured at T-1 unless otherwise noted.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), FD (first-difference), RE (random effects).  Robust standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<01  
**p<.05  *p<.10
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Table A7:   Instrumental Variable Tests 
 
Instruments 
WAVE Regional mean 
WAVE 
Regional mean 
WAVE 
Regional mean  
Global mean 
WAVE 
Regional mean  
Global mean 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MEDI     -0.026*** 
     (0.004) 
MEDI stock (10%) -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.002***  
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
GDPpc (ln) ü ü ü ü ü 
Regional avg. dep. var.    ü ü 
Global avg. dep. var.    ü ü 
Lagged dep. var. ü ü ü ü ü 
Year fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü 
Country fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 147 150 147 147 147 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 
Obs 8040 8673 8021 8021 8021 
Sargan test p-value   0.016 0.000 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-
stat. 386 1388 1003 52740 37510 
 
Two-stage least squares regression analyses with various instruments, as explained in the text. Second-stage results only 
(first-stage results available upon request).  Outcome: infant mortality rate.  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.  *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10 
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Table A8:   Possible Non-linearities in GDP 
 
 1 2 3 
MEDI stock (10%) -0.059*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
GDPpc (ln) -0.388*** 1.063** 8.363** 
 (0.067) (0.420) (3.745) 
GDPpc (ln)2  -0.090*** -0.999** 
  (0.028) (0.463) 
GDPpc (ln)3   0.037* 
   (0.019) 
Year FE ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü 
Countries 150 150 150 
Years 111 111 111 
Obs 8787 8787 8787 
R2 (within) (0.910) (0.917) (0.920) 
 
Outcome: infant mortality rate (ln).  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  Estimator: 
ordinary least squares.  Standard errors clustered by country.  *** p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10   
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Table A9:   Horse-race Tests 
 
Alternate Indices Polity2 UDS 
Contes 
-tation 
Inclusive 
-ness 
Partici 
-pation 
Deliber 
-ation 
Egalit 
-arian 
Female 
power 
Civil 
society 
Individual 
liberty BMR BNR 
 (Marshall) (Pemstein) (Miller) (Miller) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (V-Dem) (Boix) (Bernhard) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
MEDI stock -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.060*** -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.036** -0.050*** -0.061*** -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.038*** 
   (10%) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Alternate index 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.009* 0.001 0.001 -0.024*** -0.010 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006* 
   stock (1%) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln) ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 148 148 146 146 150 150 150 149 150 150 145 148 
Years  111 63 105 105 111 111 111 111 111 111 107 60 
Obs (approx.) 8054 6773 7190 7201 8787 8787 8787 7645 8787 8787 7558 6337 
 
Outcome: infant mortality rate (ln).  Units of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  Estimator: ordinary least squares.  Standard errors clustered by country.  *** 
p<01  **p<.05  *p<.10   
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APPENDIX B: Data Collection 
 
The MEDI index is based on indicators drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
project, as are several of the other measures tested in Tables 1 and 2. It is important, therefore, 
to understand a bit about how the data was collected and aggregated across coders. (For further 
information see Coppedge et al. (2015) and Pemstein et al. (2015).) 
Each indicator in the V-Dem dataset that is not factual in nature is coded by multiple 
Country Experts, generally about five (5). Most experts do not possess the requisite expertise to 
code the entire V-Dem questionnaire, which means that a single country will generally be coded 
by a dozen or more experts, each working on different facets of the questionnaire. To date, V-
Dem has engaged in collaboration with over 2,500 Country Experts. 
Recruitment  
The following procedure is used to recruit Country Experts. First, we identify a list of potential 
coders for a country (typically 100-200 names per country). This bulk of names on the list are 
provided by Regional Managers (members of the V-Dem project located in universities and 
think-tanks throughout the world) in consultation with other members of the V-Dem team. 
Assistant Researchers (located at V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg) also contribute to 
this list, using information about potential country experts gathered from the web. Other 
members of the project team provide additional names if they have country-specific expertise. At 
present, V-Dem has accrued a roster of 15,000+ potential Country Experts. 
For each potential Country Expert on the resulting list, we compile basic information – 
country of origin, current location, highest educational degree, current position, and area of 
expertise in terms of the surveys the expert could code as evidenced by a short biographical 
sketch and/or list of publications, website information and the like. We also take note of any 
possible biases that might affect their ability to code questions in a dispassionate manner.  
In selecting whom to recruit from this list five criteria come into play: 
The most important selection criterion, naturally, is expertise in the country(ies) and the 
section of the survey they are assigned to code. This is usually signified by an advanced degree in 
the social sciences, law, or history; a record of publications; and positions in civil society that 
establish their expertise in the chosen area (e.g. a well-known and respected journalist). Naturally, 
potential coders are drawn to areas of the survey that they are most familiar with, and are 
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unlikely to agree to code topics they know little about. So, self-selection also works to achieve 
our primary goal of matching questions in the survey with country-specific expertise. 
The second criterion is origin in the country to be coded. V-Dem’s goal is that a 
minimum of three out of five (60%) Country Experts should be nationals or permanent 
residents of the country they code (preferably both). Exceptions are required for a few countries 
where it is difficult to find in-country coders who are both qualified and independent of the 
governing regime. This criterion should help avoid potential Western/Northern biases in the 
coding.  
The third criterion is the prospective coder’s seriousness of purpose. By this, we mean a 
person’s willingness to devote time to the project, to deliberate carefully over the questions asked 
in the survey, and to report their honest judgment. Sometimes, personal acquaintanceship is 
enough to convince a Regional Manager that a person is fit, or unfit, for the job. Sometimes, this 
feature becomes apparent in communications with Project Coordinators that precede the offer 
to work on V-Dem. 
The fourth criterion is impartiality. V-Dem aims to recruit coders who will answer 
survey questions in an impartial manner. This means avoiding those who might be beholden to 
powerful actors – by reason of coercive threats or material incentives – or who serve as 
spokespersons for a political party or ideological tendency (in some instances, such as North 
Korea, this may entail avoiding all in-country coders). Where this is difficult, or where the reality 
is difficult to determine, we aim to include a variety of coders who, collectively, represent an 
array of views and political perspectives on the country in question. 
The final criterion is obtaining diversity in professional background among the coders 
chosen for a particular country. For certain areas (e.g the media, judiciary, and civil society 
surveys) this entails a mixture of highly recognized professionals from the sector along with 
academics who study these topics. Generally, it also means finding experts who are located at a 
variety of institutions, universities and research institutes.  
After weighing these five criteria, the 100-200 potential experts on the list are given a 
rank from “1” to “3” indicating order of priority.  
The two Project Coordinators at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, then 
handle the enrolment of Country Experts from the list of potential country experts. In handling 
the recruitment, the continuously review the resulting mix of actual country experts in light of 
the five criteria to ensure that V-Dem ends up with a set of experts for each country that fulfill 
our standards.  
If the quota of five Country Experts per section of the survey for each country is not 
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met, we work down the list of potential Country Experts until the quota is obtained. Others, 
following the same procedure, replace those who fail to complete the survey in a reasonable 
time. Coders receive a modest honorarium for their work that is proportional to the number of 
surveys they have completed. 
A number of steps are taken to assure informed consent and confidentiality among 
participants. The on-line survey provides full information about the project (including this 
document) and the use of the data, so that coders are fully informed. It also requires that 
prospective coders certify that they accept the terms of the agreement. They can access the 
surveys only with a randomized username that we assign and a secret password that they create 
themselves. The data they supply is stored on a firewall-protected server. Any data released to 
the public excludes information that might be used to identify coders. All personal identifying 
information is kept in a separate database in order to ensure the protected identities of coders.  
In order to ensure that we are able to recruit widely among potential experts, and in 
order to minimize confusion due to unfamiliarity with English, questions are translated from 
English into five additional languages: Arabic, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. 
Approximately 15 percent of the experts code in a non-English version of the questionnaire. 
About 35 percent of the Country Experts are women, and over 80 percent have PhDs 
or MAs and are affiliated with research institutions, think tanks, or similar organizations. 
Coding 
Coding is carried out using the V-Dem online survey tool. The web-based coding interfaces are 
directly connected with a postgres database where the original coder-level data is kept, 
maintaining coder confidentiality. 
In addition to country-specific ratings, Country Experts are requested to code several 
additional countries that they are familiar with for a shorter time-slice. This «bridge» or «lateral» 
coding assures cross-country equivalence by forcing coders to make explicit comparisons across 
countries, and provides critical information for the measurement model (described below).  
For each question, and for each country-year, experts are required to report a self-
assessed level of certainty. This is an indicator of their subjective level of uncertainty for the data 
point they provide. This is scored on a scale from 0 to 100 with substantive anchor points for 
each 10-percent interval.  
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Measurement 
Having discussed the process of data collection, we proceed to the task of measurement. Under 
this rubric, we include (a) the questionnaire, (b) our measurement model, (c) methods of 
identifying error in measurement, (d) studies of measurement error, and (e) methods of 
correcting error. In principle, the discussions are relevant for different types of data (A, B, and C 
in the V-Dem scheme) but most if not all of them are much more acute when it comes to 
expert-based coding of evaluative, non-factual yet critical indicators. Hence, most of the 
following is focused on the C-type indicators. 
The most important feature of a survey is the construction of the questionnaire itself. 
In crafting indicators we have sought to construct questions whose meaning is clear and specific 
and not open to a wide variety of interpretations. They should mean the same thing (more or 
less) in each context and not suffer from temporal or spatial non-equivalence. Our methodology 
involves enlisting some of the leading scholars in the world on different aspects of democracy 
and democratization – known as Project Managers.  
Each Project Manager was enrolled because of his/her specific and evidenced expertise 
in a particular area (e.g. legislatures, executives, elections, civil society, and so on) and with a view 
to generate a group that also had substantive experiences and expertise on all regions of the 
world. Starting in 2009, Project Managers designed survey-questions in their area to measure 
democraticness in relation to the different traditions of democratic theory. All suggestions were 
reviewed and refined collectively over the course of two years. The V-Dem pilot test carried out 
in 2011 served as an initial test of our questionnaire, prompting quite a few revisions in the next 
round of surveys. Another round of collective deliberation followed that also involved a number 
of consultations with scholars outside of the project team. The revised questions for C-coding 
thus went through several rounds of review with the Project Managers and outside experts over 
the course of two years before emerging in their final form, depicted in the Codebook. 
Even with careful question design, a project of this nature cannot help but encounter 
error. This may be the product of linguistic misunderstandings (recall that most of our coders do 
not speak English as their first language and some take the survey in a translated form), 
misunderstandings about the way in which a question applies to a particular context, factual 
errors, errors due to the scarcity or ambiguity of the historical record, differing interpretations 
about the reality of a situation, variation in standards, coder inattention, errors introduced by the 
coder interface or the handling of data once it has been entered into the database, or random 
mistakes. 
Some of these errors are stochastic in the sense of affecting the precision of our 
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estimates but not their validity. Other errors are systematic, potentially introducing bias into the 
estimates that we produce.  
Having five coders for each question is immensely useful, as it allows us to identify 
wayward coders as well as to conduct inter-coder reliability tests. These sorts of tests – standard 
in most social science studies – are rarely if ever employed in extant democracy indices.  
While we select experts carefully, they clearly exhibit varying levels of reliability and 
bias, and may not interpret questions consistently. In such circumstances, the literature 
recommends that researchers use measurement models to aggregate diverse measures where 
possible, incorporating information characterized by a wide variety of perspectives, biases, and 
levels of reliability (Bollen & Paxton 2000, Clinton & Lapinski 2006, Clinton & Lewis 2008, 
Jackman 2004, Treier & Jackman 2008, Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010). To combine expert 
ratings for a particular country/indicator/year to generate a single “best estimate” for each 
question, we employ methods inspired by the psychometric and educational testing literature (see 
e.g. Lord & Novick 1968, Jonson & Albert 1999, Junker 1999, Patz & Junker 1999).  
The underpinnings of these measurement models are straightforward: they use patterns 
of cross-rater (dis)agreement to estimate variations in reliability and systematic bias. In turn, 
these techniques make use of the bias and reliability estimates to adjust estimates of the latent—
that is, only indirectly observed—concept (e.g. executive respect for the constitution, judicial 
independence, or property rights) in question. These statistical tools allow us to leverage our 
multi-coder approach to both identify and correct for measurement error, and to quantify 
confidence in the reliability of our estimates.  Variation in these confidence estimates reflect 
situations where experts disagree, or where little information is available because few raters have 
coded a case. These confidence estimates are tremendously useful. Indeed, the tendency of most 
researchers to treat the quality of measures of complex, unobservable concepts as equal across 
space and time, ignoring dramatic differences in ease of access and measurement across cases, is 
fundamentally misguided, and constitutes a key threat to inference. 
The majority of expert-coded questions are ordinal:  they require raters to rank cases on 
a discrete scale, generally with four or five response categories. To achieve scale consistency, we 
fit ordinal IRT models to each question (see Johnson & Albert 1999 for a technical description 
of these models). These models achieve three goals. First, they work by treating coders’ ordinal 
ratings as imperfect reflections of interval-level latent concepts. Therefore, while an IRT model 
takes ordinal values as input, its output is an interval-level estimate of the given latent trait (e.g. 
election violence). Interval-valued estimates are valuable for a variety of reasons; in particular, 
they are especially amenable to statistical analysis. Second, IRT models allow for the possibility 
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that coders have different thresholds for their ratings (e.g. one coder’s somewhat might fall 
above another coder’s almost on the latent scale), estimate those thresholds from patterns in the 
data, and adjust latent trait estimates accordingly. Therefore, they allow us to correct for this 
potentially serious source of bias. This is very important in a multi-rater project like V-Dem, 
where coders from different geographic or cultural backgrounds may apply differing standards to 
their ratings. Finally, IRT models assume that coder reliability varies, produce estimates of rater 
precision, and use these estimates—in combination with the amount of available data and the 
extent to which coders agree—to quantify confidence in reported scores. 
 With lateral and bridge coding we are able to mitigate the incomparability of coders’ 
thresholds and the problem of cross-national estimates’ calibration. While helpful in this regard, 
our tests indicate that given the sparsity of our data, even this extensive bridge-coding is not 
sufficient in solving cross-national comparability issues. We therefore also employ a data-
collapsing procedure. At its core, this procedure relies on the assumption that as long as none of 
the experts change their ratings for a given time period, we can treat the country-years in this 
period as one year. The results of our statistical models indicate that this technique is extremely 
helpful in increasing the weight given to lateral/bridge coders, and thus further mitigates cross-
national comparability problems. 
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